Over the past two decades, China has rapidly expanded its presence in Africa in various areas, from the economy and infrastructure to the information space, politics, and even military cooperation. China has already become the largest trading partner for African countries, a major creditor and source of investment, actively financing infrastructure projects and expanding cultural and informational influence. This comprehensive expansion is accompanied by the promotion of narratives and values favorable to Beijing, shaping a new balance of power on the continent.

In this article, the MIM:AGENCY team will explore the manifestations of China’s growing influence in Africa – economic expansion, infrastructure projects, information and cultural impact, political soft power, and military presence.

China’s economic expansion in Africa

Chinese-African economic ties experienced explosive growth in the early 21st century. The volume of bilateral trade between China and Africa grew from about $10 billion in 2000 to a record $282 billion in 2023. This leap made China Africa’s largest bilateral trading partner, surpassing traditional players. About 20% of African exports now go to the Chinese market, while 16% of imports to the continent come from China. Africa mainly supplies raw materials to China – metals, minerals, and oil, which account for almost ⅗ of its exports to China, while importing mainly industrial products, machinery, and electronics from China.

This has created a significant imbalance: China exports far more goods to Africa than it imports. In 2023, China’s exports to Africa reached $173 billion, while imports from Africa amounted to only $109 billion, leaving Africa with a trade deficit of about $64 billion with China.

The pace of trade growth is particularly impressive in retrospect. Just 20 years ago, China was the main supplier of goods to only 4 African countries (Gambia, Benin, Sudan, and Djibouti). Today, more than 30 African countries import primarily from China, indicating a radical reorientation of import supply chains in favor of Chinese manufacturers. The value of Chinese exports to Africa has increased tenfold over this period: from $5 billion in the early 2000s to about $110 billion at the turn of the 2020s. For example, in 2015, when commodity prices plummeted, China’s exports to Africa exceeded $100 billion, while imports of African goods to China dropped to about $67 billion. Although African exports have since partially recovered, Africa’s chronic negative trade balance with China remains a reality.

Another dimension of economic expansion is the growth of investment and lending. China has become Africa’s largest bilateral lender, providing a significant share of external loans for infrastructure, mining, and energy projects. China’s share of sub-Saharan Africa’s public external debt increased from less than 2% in 2005 to ~17% (equivalent to $134 billion) as of 2021. Beijing has also been actively increasing its direct investment: annual Chinese FDI in Africa has grown from $75 million in 2003 to a peak of $5 billion in 2022.

Although these amounts are still relatively small (about 4.4% of total FDI inflows to the region), China is increasingly involved in the African economy as an investor in transportation, mining, energy, and manufacturing. It is noteworthy that approximately 70% of Chinese companies operating in Africa now belong to the private sector rather than the state-owned, meaning that economic interaction goes beyond government mega-projects and includes small and medium-sized businesses.

Importantly, the development of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) opens up new opportunities for cooperation. The AfCFTA creates a single market with a population of 1.3-1.7 billion and a total consumer market of more than $3.4 trillion, which attracts Chinese business. Chinese entrepreneurs see Africa not only as a source of resources, but also as a growing consumer market and production platform. Cooperation under the AfCFTA and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is expected to complement each other, contributing to the formation of regional value chains. Thus, China’s economic influence is evolving from mere trade expansion to deeper integration into the production processes and development of African markets.

Infrastructure impact, BRI, and large projects

One of the most tangible manifestations of Chinese influence in Africa is large-scale infrastructure projects. Launched in 2013, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has become a framework within which Beijing finances the construction of roads, railways, ports, power plants, and other infrastructure on the continent. As of 2023, 52 African countries have joined the BRI (by signing memoranda of understanding with China), and even the African Union. Chinese companies – mostly state-owned – are actively implementing hundreds of projects designed to eliminate infrastructure bottlenecks in Africa’s development, while strengthening China’s strategic presence.

The scale of China’s infrastructure contribution is impressive. According to the Chinese government, since 2013 alone, China has helped build more than 6,000 kilometers of railroads and 6,000 kilometers of roads in Africa, as well as more than 80 large-scale power facilities.

Much of today’s notable infrastructure facilities – railroads, highways, airports, seaports, dams – were built with China’s participation. For example, in East Africa, China funded the construction of a new standard gauge railway from Mombasa to Nairobi (Kenya), modernized the Addis Ababa-Djibouti railway, and built ports and highways in Tanzania, Nigeria, Angola, and other countries. China has built a new African Union headquarters building in Addis Ababa as a “gift” to the African peoples, which also has a symbolic meaning. It is estimated that in 2018, China provided about 25% of all investments in Africa’s infrastructure (second only to the total investments of African governments themselves). That is, every fourth dollar for roads, power plants, or other facilities came from Chinese sources.

Many of these projects are implemented based on concessional loans or “loans in exchange for resources”. Chinese state-owned banks, such as the Export-Import Bank of China and the China Development Bank, provide loans to African governments for infrastructure construction, often on the condition that they engage Chinese contractors and supply Chinese equipment. As a result, several countries are heavily indebted to Beijing: in particular, Angola owes China about $20 billion (mostly for loans for energy and transportation projects), Ethiopia about $13.5 billion (railways, industrial parks, etc.), and Kenya about $9.8 billion (including financing for the SGR railroad).

Such volumes of debt have sparked discussions about a “debt trap,” but many African leaders view Chinese loans as a necessary source of development, given the chronic lack of investment. In response, China has taken a more cautious approach to new loans in recent years, trying to avoid defaults and reviewing loan terms at the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC).

The BRI initiative is closely integrated with African strategic development programs. China-supported projects are often aligned with the African Union’s Agenda 2063, a plan for continental integration and industrialization.

For example, Chinese industrial parks and economic zones in Ethiopia, Egypt, and Nigeria promote job creation and technology transfer. The construction of power plants with China’s support (including “green” energy facilities such as hydroelectric power plants, solar and wind farms) helps to solve the problem of energy shortages. 52 African countries and the African Union are already officially cooperating with China under the BRI, which demonstrates the pan-African reach of this initiative.

It is clear that such a powerful infrastructure offensive not only accelerates Africa’s economic development but also consolidates China’s strategic influence. Critical infrastructure such as ports, railways, and telecommunications built by the Chinese gives Beijing leverage for long-term impact. However, African countries generally welcome these investments, viewing them as an alternative to conditional Western aid. The question now is how African governments will manage the debt obligations and maximize the local impact of these projects so that Chinese expansion is transformed into a mutually beneficial partnership rather than a dependency.

Information influence: the expansion of Chinese media

China’s presence has also reached the African information space. Beijing is implementing a large-scale strategy to strengthen its “voice” on the continent by building its media assets, content partnerships, and training African journalists. China’s largest state-run news agency, Xinhua, currently has 37 bureaus in Africa, which is larger than any other international agency on the continent. For comparison, two decades ago, Xinhua had only a handful of correspondent offices in Africa.

In addition, since the mid-2000s, China has established its regional media hub in Nairobi, Kenya: after Xinhua’s African headquarters moved to Nairobi in 2006, the Chinese international television CGTN (China Global Television Network), the newspaper China Daily, and the radio China Radio International opened offices there. All of them are located in one complex in the prestigious Westland’s neighborhood, from where they broadcast content across Africa via multilingual channels.

The Chinese media are purposefully adapting their product to the African audience. For example, CGTN has launched special programs such as Africa Live, Talk Africa, and Faces of Africa, which highlight African realities and success stories in an effort to gain the trust of viewers.

At the same time, these programs unobtrusively promote a positive image of China and its “selfless assistance” to Africa. A key tool is a partnership with local media. The Xinhua News Agency has signed content exchange agreements with major African media holdings, including the largest private media group in East Africa, Nation Media Group (Kenya). As part of this cooperation, the Chinese side provides free news and stories that are broadcast on 8 TV channels and radio stations in 4 countries (covering a potential audience of 11.3 million viewers per month, 28 million subscribers on social media and a daily circulation of 90 thousand copies of the newspaper).

Much of the content for such materials must be prepared by African journalists themselves, but at Chinese expense and from Chinese sources, which makes pro-Chinese messages more “invisible” to the public.

China is also investing in the technological infrastructure of the media sphere. StarTimes, a private Chinese media company, has become one of the leading digital television providers in Africa, second only to South Africa’s DSTV.  StarTimes is actively expanding its coverage: through joint projects with governments, it is installing satellite TV dishes in 10,000 rural communities in 20 countries, connecting millions of new households to digital TV with predominantly Chinese and pro-regime channels. In this way, the Chinese narrative is penetrating even remote regions that previously had no access to television. A similar expansion is taking place in radio broadcasting: China Radio International broadcasts in popular African languages (Swahili, Hausa, etc.), and mobile operators distribute Chinese news content via SMS and Internet applications.

At the same time, China is making “soft” inroads into African newsrooms through training and scholarships. According to researchers, hundreds of young African journalists are trained in Chinese media organizations every year. In Kenya, for example, Chinese media have employed more than 500 local journalists and staff, who together produce about 1,800 news stories a month for Chinese and partner publications.

China regularly invites groups of journalists from all over Africa to fully paid courses and study tours – the so-called “media junkets”. During these trips, guests are introduced to China’s “achievements” and given seminars on the Chinese development model, often without direct propaganda, but with the hope of gaining loyalty. As Kenyan journalist Bob Wekesa noted, the Chinese “don’t tell you to be pro-China directly, but if you pay attention, you realize that a certain amount of loyalty is expected of you.” In large newsrooms, schedules were already being jokingly drawn up so that “half of our newsroom would not find themselves in Beijing ” for the next training session.

This large-scale media campaign has a clear strategic goal. The CCP leadership sees the media as a “battleground” for the minds and hearts of the world.

In Africa, this means promoting a narrative of China as a friend and partner that brings:

  • development without political conditions;
  • the benefits of the Chinese development path;
  • whitewashing controversial issues. For example, dismissing human rights violations in Xinjiang as “Western propaganda,” etc.

Chinese state media is present in local information ecosystems to the extent that it can distort Africans’ access to independent information.

Journalists who criticize China’s projects or Beijing-backed local authorities are often subjected to pressure. An illustrative case occurred in Kenya: after The Standard published an investigation into corruption in the construction of a Chinese railroad, the Chinese embassy withdrew all advertising and demanded that negative publications be stopped.

As a result, the newspaper lost funding from Chinese advertisers and was forced to close its bi-weekly Chinese-sponsored supplement.

Despite these efforts, the effectiveness of Chinese media expansion is not yet certain. Polls show that most Africans retain their own opinions: about 71% of the African population prefer democracy and disapprove of the CCP-style one-party rule. Chinese messages resonate more with ruling elites and officials than with the public.

Nevertheless, China’s information presence on the continent has already become a powerful factor. It allows Beijing to shape the discourse, from international issues (for example, to enlist the support of African countries on Taiwan or the South China Sea) to local issues (to highlight Chinese investments in a favorable light, to support pro-regime positions). African civil society and independent media have to withstand not only domestic pressure but also an avalanche of foreign (in this case, Chinese) disinformation, which is often spread through social media and anonymous channels. Thus, the information front is becoming one of the key arenas where the “soft competition” for Africa is unfolding.

Political influence and China’s “soft” power

In addition to the economy and media, China is increasingly using soft power tools to promote its political interests and values in Africa. This is an influence achieved not through military or economic coercion, but through the attractiveness of its model, cultural diplomacy, educational exchanges, and ideological work with elites. The Communist Party of China (CPC) has developed a wide network of contacts with African political parties, government officials, students, and public figures, seeking to create an environment favorable to Beijing among them.

One of the pillars of China’s soft power is cultural and educational expansion. More than 50 Confucius Institutes, specialized centers for studying the Chinese language and culture, have been opened in Africa in more than 40 countries on the continent. As of the end of the 2010s, about 150,000 African students studied at these institutes annually.

Through Mandarin language classes, cultural events, and literary programs, Confucius Institutes spread a positive image of China, promote respect for “traditional values” and the principle of non-interference in internal affairs – key messages of China’s “cultural diplomacy”. China also offers generous scholarships to study in China. According to official data, in 2018, more than 81,000 students from Africa studied at Chinese universities, one of the highest rates among all regions (for comparison, there were more African students in China than in the United States or Britain). Beijing deliberately creates attractive conditions for Africans: scholarships cover tuition and accommodation, and the visa regime is quite liberal. As a result, China has surpassed the United States and France to become the second most popular destination for African students in higher education (after France).

Graduates of Chinese universities often return with a favorable attitude toward the country that taught them and may become “agents of influence” in the future, promoting cooperation with China.

At the political level, the CCP is building special relations with the ruling parties in Africa, especially those that come from former independence movements. In 2018-2023, China took a qualitatively new step by helping to establish the Julius Nyerere Party School in Tanzania to train African political cadres. This institution was funded by the CPC with about $40 million in grants and opened in February 2022. It provides ideological training to officials of six ruling parties in Southern Africa – from Angola (MPLA), Mozambique (Frelimo), Namibia (SWAPO), Tanzania (CCM), South Africa (ANC), and Zimbabwe (ZANU-PF).

This is the first “branch” of the CCP Central Party School outside of China, where African allies are taught Chinese experience in governance and party building. Speaking to the students, Chinese President Xi Jinping emphasized the “need to strengthen solidarity and exchange of Chinese governance experience ” between China and Africa.

In this way, Beijing directly broadcasts its political values: centralized one-party rule, the priority of stability and development over political pluralism, and the principle of non-interference from outside. This ideological influence is especially noticeable among African authoritarian leaders, who see China as a model for maintaining power without Western pressure for democracy. Through party forums, delegation exchanges, and training, China shapes pro-Russian (or rather, pro-Chinese) narratives among African elites, supporting their rhetoric of sovereignty, “special path,” and mutual support in the international arena.

In addition, China uses traditional diplomatic soft power levers: humanitarian and medical aid, cultural events, and tourism programs. Chinese medical teams operate in more than 40 African countries, providing free medical services and strengthening the image of China as a “friend of Africa” in difficult times (this was especially evident during the COVID-19 pandemic, when Beijing sent vaccines and protective equipment). Cultural festivals, Chinese film days, and performances by artistic groups are sponsored by Chinese embassies in various capitals. Through such projects, the Chinese side seeks to demonstrate the commonality of cultural values, emphasizing the concepts of South-South and historical friendship. Often, Beijing appeals to anti-colonial sentiment, emphasizing that, unlike former metropolitan countries, China “has never been a colonizer in Africa” and has experienced imperialism and therefore understands Africans.

At the same time, it should be noted that such narratives of China are not without challenges. Civil society and opposition circles in some countries criticize the shadow side of China’s presence – corruption deals, support for repressive regimes, and the environmental impact of projects. While governments often tend to accept Chinese aid and support, the population does not always share the enthusiasm. According to Afrobarometer polls, African attitudes toward China are generally quite positive, but at the same time, people value freedom of speech and democracy and are wary of censorship or authoritarian practices. Thus, Chinese soft power has its limits: it is effective in creating alliances at the level of state elites and in ensuring the loyalty of certain groups (propagandists, graduates of Chinese universities, party cadres), but less successful in changing the fundamental political preferences of African society.

Military presence: base in Djibouti and global ambitions

Although China has historically declared the principle of “non-interference” and has long avoided military alliances, in recent years it has begun to build a military component to its African strategy. This culminated in the opening of China’s first foreign military base on African soil. In 2017, a permanent naval base of the People’s Liberation Army of China was launched on the coast of Djibouti (Horn of Africa). Officially, it is called the “Navy Logistics Center” and is designed to support China’s participation in anti-piracy missions and peacekeeping operations off the coast of Somalia. However, it is a full-fledged base with advanced capabilities.

Currently, about 2,000 Chinese military personnel are stationed there. A deep-water port with a berth capable of receiving aircraft carriers and military infrastructure (arms depots, barracks, and intelligence equipment) has been built. The base in Djibouti provides China with a strategic foothold at the point of control over key sea routes, near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, which runs through routes from Asia to Suez. The projection of China’s power in the Indian Ocean and East Africa is significantly strengthened.

Conclusions

China’s growing influence on the African continent is comprehensive. On the economic front, China has provided Africa with an unprecedented influx of trade, investment, and loans, becoming a key development partner in everything from building roads to launching factories. This expansion has brought new opportunities to Africa: infrastructure breakthroughs, cheaper consumer goods, and alternative sources of financing. At the same time, it has created dependence on Chinese imports and loans, and trade imbalances and debt risks have become new challenges for African economies.

China’s infrastructure presence – tens of thousands of kilometers of roads, railroads, ports, and power plants – has literally changed the landscape of Africa.

Chinese projects often fill the vacuum left by Western investors and promote regional integration. However, they also provide Beijing with political leverage, as recipient countries become beholden to Chinese lenders and seek to maintain friendly relations to receive new tranches or avoid harsh conditions. Often, China uses economic pressure, for example, by threatening to cut investments in response to diplomatic steps it does not like (such as the recognition of Taiwan).

In the field of soft power, China has launched a broad campaign for the “minds and hearts” of Africans: through the media, education, culture, and work with elites. Chinese media and propaganda messages have now become part of Africa’s information landscape.

This influences public opinion and political debate, often to the benefit of authoritarian governments. At the same time, the Chinese cultural presence-from Confucius Institutes to thousands of students in Beijing-is gradually creating a layer of the population familiar with the Chinese language and culture, potentially more loyal to China. At the political level, Beijing has had some success in forming pro-Chinese coalitions: most African states have consistently supported China in international organizations (for example, on UN resolutions on human rights in China or territorial disputes). In response, China is positioning itself as an advocate for the interests of the Global South, speaking with a united front with Africa on issues of climate change, development, and postcolonial justice.

The military dimension is still the least visible, but even here, China has secured a foothold and shown its readiness to defend its interests by force if necessary. The presence of a Chinese base next to the US and EU bases in Africa means that the continent is becoming an arena of strategic competition in the new era. For African countries, this opens up both opportunities (to play on the contradictions of the great powers) and risks (to fall into the orbit of other people’s geopolitical conflicts).

In general, China’s influence on Africa is twofold. On the one hand, it stimulates development, offers alternative resources and experience, and strengthens Africa’s voice on the world stage through partnership with a powerful state. On the other hand, it can limit the political and economic autonomy of African countries if they become overly dependent on one partner. Africa is now trying to use the Chinese offer to its advantage: for example, through the AfCFTA, Africans are seeking to increase the value of their participation in global supply chains so as not to remain a mere raw material annex to China. In some areas, such as digital technologies or renewable energy, African governments are already diversifying their cooperation, attracting Indian, European, and American investments alongside Chinese ones.

Chinese expansion in Africa is far from over. It is likely to deepen in the coming years, adapting to new realities: the Chinese private sector will play a greater role in trade and production, and BRI projects will become “targeted and smart.” According to Beijing’s statements, it will focus on green development and the digital economy, while soft power will try to win over the younger generation of Africans.

For Africa, the main task is to develop its strategic position in relations with China to turn this interaction into an engine of its development, while respecting the interests of its peoples. How successfully African countries balance the influences of various global players will determine their future in the multipolar world that is taking shape before our eyes.

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